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Oji achina anyi 
Na nke ja chili achi na am aforo 
Ono-kpom! Afo beer! 
In Nigeria a popular song exists which, translated into English, runs like this: 
'Let the black not rule, since their leadership so far has brought us no com-
fort. They are only greedy! Beer beilies!'1 Nigérians refer to this song when 
lamenting about the mounting cost of living, the erratic supply of water and 
electric power, or when discussing the political situation of the country. The 
opinions expressed in it seem to be shared by many. In the song, Nigérian 
leadership is accused of being more interested in accumulating personal wealth 
through office than in serving the country, as a resuit of which the population 
is said to be suffering. Not only does the song express the disappointment of 
Nigérian Citizens with the performance of their leaders, it also refers directly 
to the colonial period, implying that the British used to manage the country 
better than the Nigérians are doing since independence. The same opinion can 
be found in other songs and stories as well as in the popular press, while 
similar expressions of popular discontent have been recorded for other African 
countries.2 Although when given the choice between their own leaders and a 
second colonization, Africans would no doubt prefer the first option (they have 
a lot to blâme fhe colonizers for as well), the memory of the colonial period is 
an important aspect of the African debate on politics. In view of these frequent 
références to the colonial era it seems appropriate to characterize the current 
era as 'post-colonial África'. 
While in the expression of popular discontent the memory of the 
colonial expérience is invoked to prove that leaders do not live up to their 
héritage, African leaders often consider current problems to be the result of 
the colonial period (and of subséquent activities of former colonizers). Indeed, 
it has often been emphasized by Europeans and Africans alike, that the 
colonial expérience was a traumatic period, during which the Africans were 
oppressed by the European colonizers. Their wealth was stolen and their 
traditional forms of Organization were destroyed. But more than that, during 
the colonial era in African history, enormous changes were brought to the 
continent in a short time span: out of the whole of thousands of years of 
African history, the colonial era covers a mere fifty to hundred years, depen-
ding on the country one considers. 
Apart from the tangible physical and economie effects, colonialism had 
important conséquences for African intellectual history, since the colonial era 
ftinctions as a conceptual and intellectual watershed in African history. It 
separates the traditional África of tribes and Chiefs from the modem África of 
nation-states. Whether pre-colonial África is understood as a 'dark' continent 
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where warring tribes prohibited any development, or as a place where life was 
peaceful and well-organized, it is perceived as fundamentally different from 
post-colonial Africa. 
But when and where was this post-colonial Africa? If we rely on the 
official dates of independence, the start of the post-colonial period can easily 
be defined for each African state. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that from this date onward these states were totally independent from their 
former colonizers and it has indeed been argued that officialty independent 
African states are de facto colonies still (see below). Indicating the beginning 
of the post-colonial period for Africa as a whole is an even more dangerous 
affair, since different countries had different colonizers and went through 
different colonial expériences.3 These différences are also reflected in the 
different dates of independence; some countries gained their independence 
relatively early (Ghana in 1957, for instance) and others only recently (Zim-
babwe 1980; Namibia 1991). However, since most African countries gained 
their independence around 1960, this date can be taken as the starting date of 
the post-colonial era. 
The post-colonial expérience 
Thus, when the Europeans retreated from Africa in the 1960s, they left behind 
a continent that was fundamentally different from the one they had found on 
their arrivai. Apart from the physical memorabilia that the çolonialists left 
behind in the form of roads and buildings, they had also shaped the boundaries 
of the newly independent states, and, to a large extent, the new countries' 
forms of government, Systems of éducation, business Operations, trade contacts 
and cultural networks. 
A l l the same, independence was experienced as constituting a new 
start. It was thought that an Africa that was no longer repressed by foreign 
powers would be able to use its resources for the Africans, building strong 
nations with strong, healthy économies, providing médical care, éducation, 
and a good Standard of living. Thus, the 1960s were characterized by an 
optimistic view of Africa's future. Now, in the 1990s, it would be an exagge-
ration to regard the history of post-colonial Africa as a success story. During 
three decades of independence, expectations of a free, stable and prosperous 
Africa have not been met. Following a period of relative stability and econo-
mie growth during the 1960s, many countries have experienced severe 
economie problems since the 1980s. After thirty years of independence, 
peasants and urban labourers are worse off than before decolonization. 
Nowadays, their positions are deteriorating even more, in conséquence of the 
measures resulting from the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that are 
imposed upon African économies by the World Bank and IMF: food and 
petrol subsidies are discontinued, currencies devaluated (making imported 
goods even more expensive), while minimum wages are reduced or discarded 
entirely. According to a recently published World Bank report entitled 
6 
Introduction 
'Reforms, results and the road ahead', it will take at least forty years before 
prosperity in Africa will be back at the same level as it was twenty years ago. 
Generally speaking, contemporary Africa appears to be in bad shape. 
In many aspects the situation is even worse than during the worst moments of 
the detested colonial domination. Often economie growth did not keep up with 
the growth of population, resulting in food shortages. In the countries of the 
Sahel région, but also in Zimbabwe, famines occurred as the resuit of periods 
of drought. 
The African crisis, however, is not merely an economic one. To a 
large extent it is also a political crisis: in the three decades since decolonizati-
on, governments that started out as democracies were either overthrown by 
military coups or turned into dictatorships themselves. In a number of coun-
tries, (in Nigeria and Mozambique, for instance) famine and economie décline 
resulted from warfare. But African économies are suffering even in politically 
relatively stable states. This is for a large part fhe resuit of an African political 
culture that allows for corruption on a scale fhat undermines both politics and 
economy. In many African states, political power and economic gain became 
synonymous and political leaders accumulated enormous personal wealth. 
Often fhe politicians' hunt for lucrative deals totally dominated ofher aspects 
of fhe administration of their country. Nigérian politicians, it was said, 
transformed their system of democracy into a 'contractocracy': 'a government 
of contractors, for contractors and by contractors'.4 
Corruption was not restricted to the realm of top-politicians: on every 
level politicians and civil servants tried to enrich themselves. And not just out 
of greed. For many civil servants, corruption was a bitter necessity because, 
as a resuit of inflation, their fixed salaries were no longer sufficiënt to live on 
(provided their salaries were paid at ail). Apart from outright corruption, the 
functioning of African administrations was undermined by the trade going on 
in the offices, which took up time and energy that should have been spent on 
administrating the country. Piles of clofhing could be found on office desks, 
while the corridors of Cameroonian ministries have been characterized as 'fhe 
market place par excellence'.5 Furthermore, 'politics' often came to mean the 
distribution of subsidies and positions to the supporters of the winning party. 
Therefore, the Tanzanian C C M party was sometimes referred to as 'Chukua 
Chake Mapema': 'Dig In and Help Yourself', while a Nigérian political party 
chose the name 'I chop, you chop' ('I eat, you eat').6 
Modernising Africa 
To reactionary western commentators, this has not corne as a surprise. In their 
view, the population of the former colonies was simply 'not yet ready' for 
independence and Africans still needed the guidance of the colonial powers in 
order to govern themselves. This explanation of the post-colonial African 
trauma reflects the traditional ideology of 'the white man's burden': fhe idea 
that it was the task and the obligation of the superior white race to bring 
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civilization and prosperity to the backward non-European peoples. It was in 
the name of this civilising mission that large portions of the globe had been 
placed under European rule in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and it was 
the early decolonization of the colonies that had prevented the fulfilment of 
this mission. 
In other words, according to these commentators, modern African 
problems originate from the fact that the continent is still too African: traditio-
nal tribes still exist and backward tribal usages and notions still hamper the 
development of a modem África. Conflicts that are fought along ethnic lines 
are considered 'tribal wars', reflecting irrational, traditional antagonisms, 
rather than competition for resources in a modern state. Curiously enough, 
this opinión is shared by many Africans, especially by those in power. 
After decolonization, the African political elites were dominated by the 
members of the nationalist movements that had championed for independence 
during the colonial period. These nationalist movements were a product of the 
educated elite, which was also the group closest in contact and collaboration 
with the colonial government. The members of these movements (and of the 
later independent governments) combined a sense of African awareness and 
dislike of colonial government with a very western political ideology. Indeed, 
they shared most western, 'modern' ideas concerning 'primitive' rural Afri-
cans, such as the need for modernization and nation-building. Therefore, their 
political programs were aimed at national integration and rejected the idea of a 
government based on ethnic groups, tribes being regarded as old-fashioned 
relies that were doomed to disappear into the twentieth century. 
Both liberal and socialist politicians and commentators believed that the 
breakdown of the traditional African societies, together with nation-building, 
would allow the new African states to transcend their ethnic differences to 
become stable and peaceful nation-states. When confronted with the failure of 
these politics, most African national governments tended to regard this revival 
of 'tribalism' as an unwanted and inexplicable regression into a traditional 
culture of undeveloped rurals that had to be combatted with all available 
means. Significantly, the African political debate is still conceived in terms of 
modernity and backwardness. Modernization and nation-building still feature 
on the political agenda, while more 'developed' groups continue to look down 
upon the rural population on the grounds of their 'backwardness'. 
The colonial héritage 
Other approaches to África's problems existed as well. In opposition, it was 
pointed out that the colonial period brought many changes to the continent, 
and it was asserted that at least part of the problems of post-colonial África 
sprang from the colonial héritage. Instead of being the saviour of África, 
Europe came to be regarded as the destroyer of África. 
One way in which Europe is believed to have destroyed África, is by 
exploiting both its people and its natural resources. Initially, Europe did this 
8 
Introduction 
by exporting a large proportion of the African population to the Americas in 
the Atlantic slave trade. Later, by plantation farming, mining, and by proleta-
rization of the African people. 
Similarly, modern ethnic conflicts were regarded as resulting from the 
way in which the continent had been divided during the colonial conquest. It is 
often claimed that the European colonizers did not pay any attention to the 
existing African political situation, as a result of which states and regional 
boundaries cut fhrough the territories of African peoples, or brought formerly 
independent peoples into one territory, thereby creating the problem which of 
these groups would lead the country after independence. 
It is not quite true, however, that Europeans were not interested in the 
way African societies were organized. Rather than ignoring the African socio-
political structure, they tried to ally fhemselves with the existing power 
groups.7 The real problem was that the Europeans often failed to understand 
how African social organizations operated (notwifhstanding government-funded 
anfhropological research on 'native' political and judicial institutions).8 This 
was the problem from which the British colonial administrators suffered when 
fhey tried to implement their principle of 'indirect rule'. The intention was to 
govern the Africans fhrough their own political institutions and to interfere 
only when absolutely necessary, leaving the indigenous political institutions 
intact. Of course, it is impossible for any colonial administration to use a 
traditional system without changing it, since the goals of the colonial system 
were different from those of the native system. A less obvious problem was 
that the system altered the balance of power in the society under rule (as any 
colonial system does). Thus, local authorities and chiefs became dependent on 
the state for support, rather than on their people.9 In general, the social status 
of a 'chief' changed during the colonial era. Sometünes, chiefs were created in 
societies where previously no chiefs existed, while it also happened that the 
'wrong' person was recognized as chief. Many more examples could be 
offered of the subtle ways in which 'traditional' African societies changed as a 
result of the impact of colonialism. 
According to these views, Africa's problems did not spring from its 
being African, but rather from the fact that 'authentic' African traditions had 
been destroyed. Africa ceased to be Africa and modern Africa, it is said, was 
no longer 'authentic'. That is, the single cultural tradition to which all the 
people within a country or a larger region could subscribe, has been destroyed 
during the colonial period, and Africans, bereft of their own culture, are 
forced to incorporate foreign notions. Nowadays, not even the basic criteria 
for perceiving reality are commonly shared, while certainly no consensus 
exists regarding existing chokes, objectives, priorities, standards, ethics and 
legitimacy on any issue.10 Thus, the traumatic colonial experience led to a 
situation in which Africans supposedly were alienated from their culture. Basil 
Davidson has argued that this alienation of Africa from its roots is the main 
cause for the political problems the continent experiences.11 According to Jan 
Vansina, the main problem is that the impact of European culture was unba-
lanced. Although the masses and the leadership were involved with both 
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Western and non-Western notions and traditions, the minority culture of the 
ruling group was Europeanized to a far greater extent than the majority 
culture. As a resuit of this, there is a culture gap between the African ruling 
group and the masses, whereby the culture of the majority of the Africans is 
oppressed.12 
Dependency and neo-colonialism 
In the 1970s, intellectuals (both in Africa and in the West) and African 
governments reached the conclusion that the so-called post-colonial African 
states were not really independent, at least not economically. The exploitation 
of African économies by the West, that had started during the colonial era, 
continued after independence: the économies of many countries were dominat-
ed by foreign companies, while more money flowed from Africa to Europe 
than from Europe to Africa as a resuit of the low priées for raw materials like 
cocoa on the world market and the repayments on loans that African govern-
ments had with Western banks. African économies were still dépendent on aid 
and grants from the West, although Western development aid to Africa was 
meagre compared to the profits that Western companies gained from Africa's 
productive wealth. This situation did not make things easier for African 
leaders who wanted to develop their countries. It has been observed that 
'deepening impoverishment piled tremendous handicaps on every effort at 
honesty and hard work.' 1 3 Whether they deserved it or not, the African leaders 
were held responsible by the population for poverty and hunger. 
Therefore, African political leaders and intellectuals concluded that the 
'flag-independence' of decolonization had to be followed by real political and 
economic independence. This 'real' independence still has not been achieved, 
notwithstanding programmes that governments initiated in order to 
'nationalize' or 'Africanize' African économies (programs that often succeeded 
in transferring ownership of businesses from expatriâtes into the hands of the 
government élite). The dependency on the West appears to have increased 
rather than decreased over the past décades. As a resuit of the continuing 
underperformance and the heavy debt burdens of African économies, Western 
governments and international organizations are in a position to demand 
structural political and economic changes as a prerequisite for support. 
Especially the World Bank and the IMF are accused of neo-colonialism 
because of the way they impose their structural adjustment programmes upon 
African countries, infringing upon the African governments' sovereignty. 
African historiography 
These différent analyses of the problems that Africans encounter were formu-
lated décades ago, but are still important. Over the years, they provided the 
underlying ideas for many studies by anthropologists and political scientists 
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and had a profound impact on the way in which African history is perceived. 
As far as the latter is concerned, African historiography has developed enor-
mously over the past décades, completely shredding the earlier image of an 
África without a history. This does not mean fhat people actually believed that 
África had no history at ail, but rather that its history was considered irrele-
vant. African communities were considered to be 'pristine societies' whose 
modes of living had not significantly changed over the centuries. As such, 
thèse societies were considered to be inferior to Western societies and, 
ultimately, bound to disappear into Western civilization. The future of África 
was to be found, not in its past, but in the hands of colonial administrators and 
missionaries. 
Düring the post-colonial period of nation-building, historians had the 
important task of providing África with a past. In doing this, fheir primary 
aim was to explicitly prove that pre-colonial África had a history. They 
furfhermore assisted in legitimising the newly independent states by proving 
that African states were not merely colonial créations, but fhat already in pre-
colonial África there had been tendencies towards centralization of power (the 
strengthening of a single political authority) and enlargement of scale (territo-
rial expansion, usually by conquest). Thus, ail efforts that could be seen as 
furthering centralization were considered as positive, with little regard for 
their meaning in their own time and place. As Caroline Neale puts it, 'it was 
the direction, more than the process, of change which was important.'14 She 
illustrâtes this point with a quotation from R. Oliver, who in a 1963 publicati-
on had applauded the strengthening of the Ganda monarchy (which is remem-
bered in oral tradition as a time of 'bad and bloody tyranny'): 'Without doubt 
... strong government was an aid to expansion ... (It enabled Buganda to 
move) from a feudal to a bureaucratie System.'15 
Generally speaking, historians have not been very concerned with the 
post-colonial history of África. Until recently, to them the end of colonialism 
was the end of history. When attention was paid to post-colonial África, this 
was usually in the form of some remarks on this period, included in a final 
chapter. It hardly ever constituted a research topic in its own right. The post-
colonial period was left to the anfhropologists and political scientists. Furfher-
more, it was not expected that the period would provide necessary dues for 
understanding contemporary África. These dues were thought to be found in 
the colonial period, a popular topic of research. When the colonial past was 
discussed, the rights and wrongs of the colonial conquest and the colonial raie 
that followed were presented and its influence on contemporary África asses-
sed. 
What historians have started to question, however, is how important 
the colonial period actually was. It has been asserted by some that the colonial 
period cannot have been really influential because of its limited time span (as 
already mentioned, a mere fifty to hundred years). Others claim fhat the 
control that the colonizers had over their African colonies is overestimated. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah narrâtes that: 
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Most of us who were raised during and for some time after the 
colonial era are sharply aware of the ways in which the coloni-
zers were never as fully in control as our elders allowed them to 
appear. We all experienced the persistent power of our own 
cognitive and moral traditions: in religion, in such social occasi-
ons as the funeral, in our experience in music, in our practice in 
dance, and, of course, in the intimacy of family life. Colonial 
authority sought to stigmatize our traditional religious beliefs, 
and we conspired in this fiction by concealing our disregard for 
much of European Christianity ...; the colonial state established 
a legal system whose patent lack of correspondence with the 
values of the colonized threatened not those values but the 
colonial legal system.16 
Although some restraint as to the impact of colonialism indeed seems approp-
riate, this poses an interesting problem for the study of post-colonial African 
history. On the one hand, there is the notion of the shallowness of colonia-
lism, while at the same time it is argued that the period had a devastating 
impact. Furthermore, it has been argued that post-colonial Africans are 
alienated from their authentic pre-colonial tradition and that, without such a 
tradition, there is not much hope for the continent (see J.-B. Gewald's review 
of Jan Vansina's Paths in the rainforest in this volume). Still others have 
argued for considering modern African states as postcolonies and, finally, 
there is the notion that Africa was never really decolonized since it is still 
economically dependent on its former colonizers. 
In this volume it was decided not to take any one of the above approaches as a 
starting point but, rather, to select a number of topics that are important in 
modern Africa. Thus we take our cue directly from the post-colonial African 
experience. From there, we can go back in time in order to assess to what 
extent the post-colonial situation has to be explained from colonial or pre-
colonial influences, what can be explained out of post-colonial history and 
where the impact of a wider global context can be found. 
One of the topics selected was ethnicity. As mentioned above, reactio-
nary observers tend to perceive African tribes as primitive and unchanging. It 
is also believed that pre-colonial Africa was characterized by utterly destructi-
ve tribal wars, the results of which were graphically described by missionaries 
and other European authorities. Modern ethnic conflicts are often still percei-
ved as 'tribal wars' in which the different groups have no other motivation for 
their actions than that tribes generally tend to fight one another. According to 
this perspective, Africans are still 'primitive'. During the past decades a lot 
has been written to refute this idea, both by anthropologists and historians. It 
has been claimed that the tribes concerned were not at all primitive and 
primordial, but rather colonial inventions, that is, 'modern'. Sometimes it was 
even stressed that ethnic identities were actually imposed on the African 
population. However, both perspectives fail to explain why ethnicity is such a 
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streng force in post-colonial Africa. The strength of ethnicity is that it combi-
nes an image of traditional, unchanging authority and authenticity, with an 
enormous flexibility in practice. The contributions on ethnicity in the current 
volume demonstrate this, as both M a (Senegal) and Luba Kasai (Zaire) 
identity went through significant changes over the past Century and both have 
been implied in (the memory of) ethnie violence in post-colonial Africa. The 
articles furthermore illustrate that ethnie identity is important, both as provi-
ding meaning to the individual person's identity, and as a basis for political 
mobilization on a larger scale. 
The debate on religion in modem Nigeria represents another hot issue, 
that of the rôle of the state in religion and the place of religion in society. It 
has been argued that in pre-colonial Africa, religion - be it animist or Islam -
was omniprésent in African societies and that the distinction between religion 
and state is a recent (colonial and post-colonial) phenomenon. Furthermore, 
the religious expérience of most individuals appears to include elements of 
both 'traditional' animist and modern monotheist Christianity or Islam. On the 
other hand, both Christianity and Islam tend to dominate the state and argue 
for a streng alliance of religion and state. In recent years especially Islam has 
been successful in dominating the state and enforcing the récognition of 
Islamic law as the official law. In Nigeria, Christianity and Islam are both 
important religions, and their fears and désires made it necessary for Nigérian 
politicians to tum their attention to a discussion of the role of religion in the 
Nigérian state. 
Compared to the political debate on the role of modem religions, 
nothing seems more primitive than witchcraft. The abundance of witchcraft 
practices in many African countries would fhus illustrate the 'primitiveness' of 
Africans and the limited impact of colonialism. Peter Geschiere's article on 
the modernity of witchcraft, on the contrary, shows that witchcraft changes 
and develops in post-colonial Africa. He demonstrates that when society 
changes, witchcraft changes, and that in post-colonial Africa even the state is 
forced to acknowledge the existence of the witchcraft menace. 
A final problem addressed is how these different elements and interests 
of post-colonial African political society can be integrated and represented in a 
viable political System. Although 'demoeratization' has been on the African 
political agenda for decades, the results so far have been disappointing. 
Experiments with different types of political system and different types of 
democracy have led in most African countries to a situation characterized by 
nepotism and corruption. If we agree with Vansina that explaining this 
situation out of a iack of ethnies' is nothing but an ethnocentric judgement,17 
and, thus, we cannot blame the politicians themselves, then we must shift our 
attention to the political system in which these people operate, and be prepared 
to consider what the options are for establishing truly democratie African 
political systems. 
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